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Seasonal variability, land values and
willingness-to-pay for a forward wheat




This article investigates the impact of a protein premiums and discounts system on
the income stream from growing wheat. Based on a biological relationship
between protein and yield in uncertain seasonal conditions, it shows that such a
system reduces the expected level and variability of wheat income. It is sub-
sequently argued, using a numerical analysis, that protein payments aect both
the attraction to wheat growers of forward contracts and the value of land used
for wheat. The nature of both of these impacts is related to the level of seasonal
variability aecting the land. Consequently, wheat growers in the more unreliable
regions of the wheatbelt may have been particularly disadvantaged by the system.
1. Introduction
A recent change in Australian wheat marketing has been the introduction
of substantial premiums and discounts for protein content. For example,
for the 1996±97 season from a standard protein content of 10 per cent for
Australian Standard White, the Australian Wheat Board (AWB) oers
symmetrical payments of $10 per tonne extra for 12 per cent protein and
$10 per tonne less for 8 per cent protein (Australian Wheat Board 1996).
This change has aected the income stream from land used for growing
wheat. In particular, because the biological impact of seasonal variability
is to create an inverse relationship between yield and protein level (for
given nitrogen availability), for a grower producing wheat with 10 per cent
protein in a typical season, protein premiums are more likely in seasons of
relatively low yield, and discounts more likely in seasons of relatively high
{This research has been funded by a Hallsworth Fellowship from the University of
Manchester. I am grateful to three anonymous referees for helpful comments on previous
versions.
*Rob Fraser works in Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Western
Australia, Nedlands WA 6907.
The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 41:2, pp. 139±155
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK or 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.yield. The existence of this inverse relationship has been established
scienti®cally by plot trials in a range of wheat-growing areas for a number
of wheat varieties.
1 Consequently, by creating such a negative correlation
between price and yield, the protein payments system eectively introduces
a form of income stabilisation scheme, while at the same time reducing the
expected level of income for growers producing wheat with the AWB's
standard protein content in typical seasons.
This consequence of the protein payments system has several implica-
tions for wheat growers, two of which are the focus of this article. First,
although the direct impact of the protein payments system is to increase
the level of price variability, overall, the system acts to reduce the level of
income variability. Therefore, it might be expected that the protein
payments system has aected the attractiveness to wheat growers of price
risk management instruments. On the assumption that wheat growers are
interested in price risk management for the purpose of income stabilisa-
tion, the analysis in this article investigates the impact of the protein
payments system on a wheat grower's willingness-to-pay for a price risk
management instrument such as a forward contract. Particular attention is
paid to the AWB's Multigrade Contract which was introduced in associ-
ation with the protein payments system. In this context it is argued that
the dominant eect of the system for growers producing wheat with the
AWB's standard protein content in typical seasons is a reduction in
expected income, thereby increasing the attractiveness to such growers of
price risk management. Moreover, as this eect is stronger in more season-
ally unreliable regions, it is suggested that the Multigrade Contract could
be dierentially priced across the wheatbelt.
The second implication of the protein payments system relates to its
impact on land values. Because the system reduces both the expected level
and the variability of income from land producing wheat with the AWB's
standard protein content in a typical season, it would appear to have had
an ambiguous impact on the value of such land for a risk-averse farmer.
The analysis in this article investigates these eects of the protein
payments system on agricultural land values, with particular emphasis on
the level of seasonal variability. It is suggested that, although the introduc-
tion of the system appears to have an ambiguous impact on the value of
land with relatively low levels of seasonal variability, this impact is more
1See, for example, Perry and Hillman (1991, pp. 108±12) and Holford, Doyle and Leckie
(1992). Note that although the existence of this inverse relationship is established, its
precise speci®cation is currently a key component of nitrogen nutrition research. Recent
evidence from Western Australia suggests some sort of hyperbolic form. See Robinson
(1995).
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Consequently, because such land is likely to be relatively low-priced
compared to land which has a more reliable yield, it is suggested that the
introduction of the protein payments system has had the overall eect of
widening the range of land values across wheat-growing areas.
The article ends with a brief conclusion which focuses speci®cally on the
issues raised in connection with the protein payments system as they relate
to growing wheat in less seasonally reliable regions.
2. Modelling the impact of a protein payments system
In the Introduction it was suggested that the AWB's protein payments
system and the inverse biological relationship between yield and protein
level (for given nitrogen availability) have combined to create a negative
correlation between price and yield for wheat grown in uncertain seasonal
conditions. Moreover, this negative correlation has the eect of decreasing
both the expected level and variability of income for growers producing
wheat with the AWB's standard protein content in a typical season.
To develop this argument systematically it is assumed in what follows
that in the absence of the protein payments system the grower's uncertain
price and season are independent. Such a simpli®cation seems reasonable
given the structure of the Australian wheat growing industry and the
relatively minor role of Australian wheat exports in the world market.
In addition, it is assumed that yield uncertainty has a multiplicative
relationship with seasonal uncertainty:
y = yy (1)
where:
y = uncertain yield per hectare
y = random parameter representing seasonal uncertainty (E(y)=1 )
y = planned (expected) yield per hectare.
Note that multiplicative production uncertainty is typically the preferred
speci®cation in the context of agricultural production (e.g. Newbery and
Stiglitz 1981, p. 65). Furthermore, in what follows y is assumed to be sym-
metrically distributed. While this assumption is unlikely to hold in regions
with a signi®cant probability of drought, empirical evidence suggests that
symmetrical yield distributions are associated with warmer, drier climates
such as prevails in much of the Australian wheatbelt (Park and Sinclair 1993).
On this basis a grower's expected level (E0(I)) and variance (Var0(I)) of
wheat income per hectare in the absence of protein payments are given by:
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Varo(I)=y
2Var(p)+p
2 Var(y) + Var(p)Var(y) (3)
where:
p = expected price per tonne
Var(p) = variance of price
Var(y) = variance of yield = y
2Var(y).
Note from (3) that an increase in the level of either price or seasonal
variability increases the level of income variability.
In recognising the impact of introducing protein premiums and
discounts, it is necessary to specify the inverse biological relationship
between yield and protein. As indicated previously, preliminary scienti®c
evidence suggests some sort of hyperbolic relationship, which is conditional
on soil type and available nitrogen (Robinson 1995).
2 A simple functional
form which satis®es these requirements is given by:
r = g/y (4)
where:
r = protein level
g = parameter relating to soil type and available nitrogen.
In the absence of scienti®c evidence to the contrary, this simple form is
maintained in what follows. However, it should be recognised that a
negative correlation between price and yield in the presence of protein
payments is a general consequence of an inverse relationship between
protein and yield and is not dependent on this particular functional form.
3
Although the AWB's existing protein payment scales are based on
protein payment increments for each 0.1 per cent of protein, in what
follows it is assumed that the quality structure of wheat can be represented
by only three grades of wheat (high, medium and low protein). This
simplifying assumption is made solely on grounds of giving priority to
analytical tractability over a more realistic representation. However, the
2Nitrogen nutrition researchers at Agriculture Western Australia support this approach
(pers. comm.).
3I am grateful to an anonymous referee for clarifying this point. Note that the simplest
functional form which represents the inverse biological relationship is given by:
r = g ± y.
However, in this case the indicated hyperbolic feature is lost. Note also that an inverse
relationship is implicit in Hertzler and Coad's (1996) assumption of a negative covariance
between yield and protein payments.
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consistent with the symmetrical feature of the AWB's payment scale:
pH = p + x if y 5g/rHy
pM = p if g/rHy 4y 5g/rLy (5)
pL = p ± x if y 4g/rLy
where:
x = size of protein premium/discount
pH = expected price with protein premium
pL = expected price with protein discount
rL = critical low protein level
rH = critical high protein level.
Finally, the critical protein levels are set symmetrically in relation to the
protein level associated with the grower's expected yield (g/y).
4 This can be
done in either of two ways:
(i) setting the probability of a premium equal to the probability of a
discount:
F(g/rHy) = (1 ± F(g/rLy)) (6)
where:
F(g/rHy) = cumulative probability of y being less than g/rHy
F(g/rLy) = cumulative probability of y being less than g/rLy,
or:
(ii) setting rL and rH symmetrically with respect to g/y.
With y assumed to be symmetrically distributed, these two approaches give
approximately the same results as long as rL and rH are relatively close to
g/y.
5 Since the protein payments system will have little impact unless rL
4This assumption focuses the impact of protein payments on income through the
negative correlation between price and yield. For growers with typical protein levels below
the AWB standard, the negative expected income eect of the system will be stronger,
while the reverse applies for typical protein levels above this standard. Consequently, the
implications of relaxing this assumption are fairly straightforward.
5With y symmetrically distributed, (i) requires setting g/rLy and g/rHy symmetrically
about unity, whereas (ii) requires setting g/rLy equal to the inverse of g/rHy. Con-
sequently, for values of g/rLy and g/rHy up to about 20 per cent away from unity, (i) and
(ii) give similar values. Note also that it is not statistically precise to refer to g/y as the
expected protein level because r is a hyperbolic function of y.
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approach is adopted as this approach features the additional simpli®cation
that the expected protein payment per tonne (E(z)) is precisely zero:
E(z)= F ( g / r H y ) x±( 1±F ( g / r L y )) x = 0. (7)
where:
z = x if y 5 g/rHy
=± x if y 4 g/rLy.









w 3 = $
?
g / r Lyy f ( y )d y .
Since w3 4 w1, the second term on the right-hand side of (8) is negative so
that recalling (2) gives:
E1(I) 5 E0(I). (9)
This result con®rms the suggestion that the introduction of protein payments
in combination with the negative biological relationship between protein and
yield reduces expected income from growing wheat which would typically
yield a standard protein content in uncertain seasonal conditions.
6
Next, notice on the basis of (5) that the variance of price in the presence
of protein payments (Var1(p)) is given by (see Mood, Graybill and Boes
1974, p. 179):
Var1(p)=Var (p+z )
=Var(p) + Var(z) + 2cov(p,z). (10)
Since price and season have been assumed to be independent in the
absence of protein payments and y is symmetrically distributed:
Var1(p)=Var(p)+2 x
2 F ( g / r Hy ). (11)
6Note that the speci®cation in this article assumes the optimal level of variable inputs is
unchanged by the introduction of the protein payments system. This impact remains to be
investigated.
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payments exceeds the variance of price in their absence. However, it is
shown in the Appendix that the variance of income in the presence of
protein payments (Var1(I)) is given by:
Var1(I) =Varo(I)+2 y
2 px(w1 ± w3)
+2 y
2 x





2 f ( y )dy.
Equation (12) shows that the impact of introducing a protein payments
system on the variance of income will be positive or negative depending on
the second and third terms on the right-hand side. Since w3 4 w1, the
second term is negative, while the third term may be positive or negative.
However, for x small relative to p, the magnitude of the second term will
dominate the third regardless of its sign and so the impact of the protein
payments system will be to reduce the variance of income:
Var1(I) 5 Var0(I). (13)
This result con®rms the suggestion that the introduction of protein
payments in combination with the negative biological relationship between
protein and yield also reduces the variability of income from growing
wheat in uncertain seasonal conditions.
The remainder of the article investigates numerically the implications of
these ®ndings both for the use by growers of price risk management instru-
ments such as forward contracts, and for the value of land used for
growing wheat.
3. Protein payments and forward contracts
In the previous section it was shown that the introduction of a protein
payments system decreases both the level of expected income and the level
of income variability from growing wheat which would typically yield a
standard protein content in uncertain seasonal conditions. It is argued here
not only that these changes will aect the attractiveness of price risk
management instruments such as forward contracts for growers who are
seeking income stabilisation, but also that the magnitude of the overall
eect is positively related both to the level of seasonal variability faced by
the grower and to the magnitude of the protein payments.
7 To support
7Speci®cally, that the divergence between w1 and w3 increases with a shift of probability
weight to the tails of the distribution of y, and that an increase in x increases the
magnitude of the second term on the right-hand side of (8) and (12).
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payments system identi®ed previously.
In order to undertake a numerical analysis of a grower's willingness-to-
pay for a forward contract using the previous ®ndings, it is necessary to
specify the probability distribution for seasonal uncertainty. Assuming a
normal distribution for y gives (see Fraser 1988):
w1 = F(g/rHy)(1 ± sy.Z(g/rHy)/F(g/r Hy))
w3 =( 1 ± F ( g / r L y ))(1+syZ(g/rL y)/(1 ± F(g/rL y)))
(g/rHy ±1) Z(g/rHy) Z(g/rHy)
m1 = F(g/rHy)s
2
y(1± ÐÐÐÐÐ ÐÐÐÐ ±(± ÐÐÐÐ)
2) sy F(g/rHy) F(g/rHy)
where:




Z(g/rHy) = ordinate of the standard normal distribution at the value
of y corresponding to the critical high protein level
Z(g/rLy) = ordinate of the standard normal distribution at the value
of y corresponding to the critical low protein level.
In addition, it is assumed that the grower's utility of pro®t (p) takes the
mean-variance form:
E(U(p)) = U(E(p)) + 1
2U@(E(p)).Var(p) (14)
where:
p = py ± c(y)
c(y) = cost of expected yield per hectare,







R = coecient of relative risk aversion.
See Hanson and Ladd (1991) and Pope and Just (1991) for arguments
supporting these assumptions.
The following parameter values are chosen for a base case:
p = 200 (= pM)
y = 100
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Var(p) = 3600 (CVp = 30%)
R = 0.7.
Note that the expected price level has been chosen to approximate actual
values, while Hazell, Jaramillo and Williamson (1990) provide supporting
estimates of world wheat price variability, and Bardsley and Harris (1987)
provide supporting estimates of attitudes to risk in the wheatbelt of
Australia.
In addition, based on the estimates of Anderson, Dillon, Hazell, Cowie
and Wan (1988) two representative levels of seasonal uncertainty are
chosen:
sy = 0.2 (CVy = 20%)
sy = 0.4 (CVy = 40%).




and, for illustrative purposes, two dierent levels of premiums and
discounts:
x = 10 (5% of p)
x = 20 (10% of p).
On the basis of these speci®cations, equation (14) can be evaluated in
the presence and absence of the protein payments system using
equations (8) and (12) and (2) and (3), respectively. This gives the
expected utility of pro®ts in the absence of any forward contracting. The
willingness-to-pay for a forward contract in the absence of protein
payments can be evaluated by eliminating the Var(p) terms from
equation (3) and adjusting downwards the level of p until expected
utility is equal to the level in the absence of forward contracting. The
dierence between this price level and the expected price is the amount
the grower is willing to pay to secure a ®xed price for each tonne of
expected wheat yield. Similarly, the willingness-to-pay for a multigrade
forward contract in the presence of protein payments can be evaluated
by eliminating the Var(p) terms from equation (12) and adjusting
downwards the level of p until expected utility is equated to the level in
the absence of forward contracting. The dierence between this price
level and the expected price is the amount the grower is willing to pay
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8
Table 1 gives details of the results of the numerical analysis, featuring
the grower's willingness-to-pay (w-t-p) for a forward contract both in
terms of $ per tonne and as a percentage of the certainty equivalent of
pro®t. Note that the certainty equivalent of pro®t (s) is given by the value
of s which solves:
U(s)=E ( U ( p )) (16)
where E(U(p)) is calculated from (14) using (15). Consider ®rst the results
in column (1) of table 1 which represent the situation prior to the intro-
duction of a protein payments system. They re¯ect the previous ®nding
(equations (2) and (3)) that an increase in the level of seasonal uncertainty
(i.e. sy = 0.2 to sy = 0.4) increases the variability of income, but leaves
expected income unchanged, and so a grower in the latter situation is
willing-to-pay a greater proportion of the certainty equivalent of pro®t to
remove price risk with a forward contract. Note the $ per tonne amounts
being almost equal re¯ects the fact that the certainty equivalent of pro®t is
smaller in the latter case.
Now consider the results which represent the situation following the
introduction of a protein payments system. For both levels of seasonal
8Note that for both the ungraded and the multigrade contracts it is assumed that there is
no penalty in the event of failure to deliver the contracted amount. This omission may
aect the absolute level of willingness-to-pay but not the relative level for the two contracts.
Table 1 Estimates of willingness-to-pay for a forward contract in the absence and presence
of a protein payments system
Size of protein payments
($/tonne)
(1) (2) (3)
Level of seasonal uncertainty x =0 x=1 0 x=2 0
s y= 0.2
w-t-p ($/tonne) 12.01 12.28 12.52
w-t-p (% certainty equivalent of pro®t) 14.56 14.90 15.22
sy = 0.4
w-t-p ($/tonne) 11.91 12.56 13.22
w-t-p (% certainty equivalent of pro®t) 17.63 18.75 19.98
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increases the willingness-to-pay for a forward contract. For example, for
the lower level of seasonal uncertainty (i.e. sy = 0.2), with protein
payments equal to 5 per cent of the expected price (i.e. x = 10), the
willingness-to-pay for a multigrade contract is 14.90 per cent of the
certainty equivalent of pro®t (or $12.28 per tonne) compared with 14.56
per cent (or $12.01 per tonne) for an ungraded contract in the absence of
protein payments.
This comparison clearly illustrates the dominance in the context of
willingness-to-pay for price risk management of the impact of protein
payments on expected income over the impact on the variability of income
for a grower producing wheat which would typically yield the AWB's
standard protein content. In the presence of protein payments such a
grower is evaluating the perceived bene®ts of a forward contract from a
lower level of expected income. The attractiveness of risk management is
enhanced at this level, so much so that even though the overall level of
income variability is also lower, the willingness-to-pay for a reduction in
this level is greater.
Moreover, the results in table 1 also show that this positive impact of
the protein payments system on the willingness-to-pay for a forward
contract is itself positively related both to the size of the protein payments
and to the level of seasonal uncertainty. Although in these situations the
magnitude of both the expected income and variability of income eects is
greater, the results in table 1 suggest that proportionately the former
impact exceeds the latter. Note, however, that if the negative impact of the
system of protein payments on expected income is diminished, then the
potential exists for the impact of the system on the variability of income to
dominate, thus resulting in a reduced willingness-to-pay for a forward
contract in the presence of protein payments. For example, further
numerical analysis shows that for a grower facing the higher level of
seasonal uncertainty (sy = 0.4), the introduction of a protein payments
system at the level of x = 20 but which has no impact on expected income
(say, because the grower's typical protein content is suciently above the
standard content) results in a willingness-to-pay for a forward contract of
17.56 per cent of the certainty equivalent of pro®t compared with 17.63
per cent in the absence of protein payments.
Nevertheless, for growers producing wheat which typically yields the
AWB's standard protein content, the results in table 1 clearly show a
dominance of the expected income eect of a protein payments system,
and the associated increase in the willingness-to-pay for a forward
contract. Moreover, the potential exists for the AWB to discriminate
between regions with dierent levels of seasonal uncertainty in terms of the
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ination seeing growers with more unreliable seasonal conditions paying
more for this type of contract.
4. Protein payments and land values
It was shown previously that a protein payments system reduces both the
expected level and variability of income from growing wheat which would
typically yield the AWB's standard protein content in uncertain seasonal
conditions. On the basis that these eects on the income stream from land
used for growing wheat aect its value, it is argued here that on balance
the eect of the system on land values is ambiguous.
9 However, it is also
argued that this eect is more likely to be negative in situations where
there is greater unreliability of seasonal conditions. To support these
arguments, consider an extension of the numerical analysis undertaken
previously. In particular, let the certainty equivalent of pro®t (s) from land
used for wheat growing act as a proxy for its value.
On this basis, the impact of the protein payments system on the value of
land used for wheat growing is represented by the percentage dierence in
the values of s which solve (16) using (14) and the pairs of equations (2)
and (3), and (8) and (12) respectively, along with the speci®ed parameter
values. Table 2 contains details of the percentage change in the
certainty equivalent of pro®ts associated with the introduction of the
protein payments system (x = 10) for the two levels of seasonal
variability (sy = 0.2; 0.4) and a range of values of risk aversion (R = 0.5;
0.7; 0.9).
It can be seen from table 2 that, at the lower level of seasonal variab-
ility, the impact on the certainty equivalent of pro®ts depends on the
Table 2 Impact of protein payments on the certainty equivalent of
pro®ts: x =5 %o fp(% change)
Level of seasonal uncertainty R
0.5 0.7 0.9
sy = 0.2 ±0.28 ±0.02 +0.21
sy = 0.4 ±1.41 ±0.88 ±0.48
9See Tegene and Kuchler (1993) for details of the use of the so-called `present value'
model for determining land values.
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negative impact of protein payments on expected income dominates overall
and the certainty equivalent of pro®ts is reduced with the introduction of
the system. However, for a more risk-averse grower (R = 0.9), the positive
impact of the system in reducing the variability of income dominates and
the certainty equivalent of pro®ts increases. Consequently, for growers
faced with this level of seasonal variability, but with a spread of attitudes
to risk around the central value of R = 0.7, there is no unambiguous
impact of the system on these growers' perceptions of the value of their
wheat growing land.
By contrast, table 2 also shows that, at the higher level of seasonal
variability, there is no such ambiguity of impact across growers with the
indicated diversity of attitudes to risk. Instead, it is clear that all these
growers would agree that the negative impact of the system on the
expected income from wheat-growing dominates and so their united
perception is of a decrease in the value of their land.
Therefore, the results in table 2 provide support for the conclusion that
the overall impact of protein payments on a grower's certainty equivalent
of pro®ts from producing wheat on land which would typically yield the
AWB's standard protein content is more likely to be negative, the larger is
the level of seasonal variability of that land. Since such land is also likely
to be relatively low-priced compared to other wheat-growing land, one
eect of the protein payments system may have been to widen the range of
land values across the wheatbelt.
5. Conclusion
This article has considered the impact of introducing a system of protein
payments both on a wheat grower's willingness-to-pay for a forward
contract and on the value of land used for growing wheat.
Using a particular speci®cation of the biological relationship between
seasonal, yield and protein uncertainty, it was shown that introducing
protein payments decreased both the expected level and variability of
income from growing wheat which would typically yield the AWB's
standard protein content in uncertain seasonal conditions.
In the context of forward contracts, it was argued that the dominant
eect of the system is on the expected level of income. As a consequence,
the attraction to wheat growers of forward contracts would be enhanced.
By contrast, in the context of land values it was argued that the eect of
the system on the value of land used for growing wheat is ambiguous.
However, in both cases it was indicated that the nature of the impact of
introducing a protein payments system was related to the level of seasonal
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able regions of the wheatbelt who not only would have experienced
proportionately larger increases in their willingness-to-pay for a forward
contract, but also are more likely to perceive the system to have reduced
their land values. This suggests that such growers have been particularly
disadvantaged by the system. Moreover, it may be that a case exists for
dierentially pricing the AWB's Multigrade Contract across the wheatbelt
in order to re¯ect its divergent levels of seasonal variability.
Appendix: Derivation of the variance of income in the presence of protein
payments
The variability of income in the presence of protein payments (Var1(I)) is
given by:
Var1(I)= $ p$ 0
g / r H y
( p H y y ± p y )
2 f ( y )d y
+ $ p$ g / r Hy
g / r Ly
( p M y y±py )
2 f ( y )d y
+ $ p$
?
g / r Ly( p L y y±py )
2 f ( y )d y (A1)






2f(y)d y±2 p H w 1p+p
2F(g/r Hy)
















w 2= $ g / r Hy
g / r Ly
y f ( y )d y
w 3= $
?
g/r L yy f ( y )d y .
Noting that:
w1 + w2 + w3 = E(y)=1 ,
and that since it has been assumed the protein payments are symmetrically
distributed about the expected price:
pHw1p + pMw2p + pLw3p = p
2 + xp(w1 ± w3), (A3)













g / r Lyp
2
L y
2 f ( y )dy ± p
2+2px(w3 ± w1)). (A4)
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Var(p) = Var(pH) = Var(pM) = Var(pL)
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+ (Var(p)+p M
2)(m2+2w 2 ±( F ( g / r Ly )±F ( g / r Hy )))
+ (Var(p)+p L
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2 f ( y )d y
m 2 = $ g / r Hy
g / r Ly
( y±1 )
2 f ( y )d y
m 3 = $
?
g / r Ly( y±1 )
2 f ( y )d y .




+2 ( w 1 + w 2 + w 3 )±F ( g / r Hy )
±( F ( g / r L y )±F ( g / r Hy ) )±( 1±F ( g / r Ly )))
+2 px(m1 ± m3 ± F(g/rHy)+(1±F(g/r Ly))+2(w1 ± w3))
+ x
2(m1+m3+2(w 1+w 3)±F ( g / r Hy ) ± (1± F(g/rLy)))
± p
2+2px(w3 ± w1)]. (A8)
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m1 = m3
and
F(g/rHy) = (1 ± F(g/rLy)).
Moreover, as:
Var(y)= m 1 + m 2 + m 3
and
2(w1+w3+w3)±F ( g / r Hy )±( F ( g / r Ly )±F ( g / r Hy ))
±( 1 ± F ( g / r L y )) = 1,






2 px(w1 ± w3)+y
2x
2(m 1+m 3
+2 ( w 1+ w 3 )±F ( g / r Hy ) ± (1 ± F(g/rLy))). (A9)
Since the ®rst term on the right-hand side of (A9) is equal to the variance






2 ( m 1+(w 1+w 3)±F ( g / r Hy )). (A10)
Equation (A10) is reproduced in the main text as equation (12).
References
Anderson, J.R., Dillon, J.L., Hazell, P.B.R., Cowie, A.J. and Wan, G.H. 1988 `Changing
variability in cereal production in Australia', Review of Marketing and Agricultural Eco-
nomics, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 270±86.
Australian Wheat Board 1996, The Growers Survival Guide to the AWB (WA), Belmont,
Western Australia.
Bardsley, P. and Harris, M. 1987, `An approach to the econometric estimation of attitudes
to risk in agriculture', Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 31, no. 2,
pp. 112±26.
Fraser, R.W. 1988, `A method for evaluating supply response to price underwriting',
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 22±36.
Hanson, S.D. and Ladd, G.W. 1991, `Robustness of the mean-variance model with trun-
cated probability distributions', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 73,
no. 2, pp. 436±45.
Hazell, P.B.R., Jaramillo, M. and Williamson, A. 1990, `The relationship between world
price instability and the prices farmers receive in developing countries', Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 227±41.
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997
R. Fraser 154Hertzler, G. and Coad, A. 1996, `Financial risk management for Australian wheat growers',
Invited paper presented at the 40th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural
and Resource Economics Society, University of Melbourne, Victoria, February.
Holford, I.C.R., Doyle, A.D. and Leckie, C.C. 1992, `Nitrogen response characteristics of
wheat protein in relation to yield responses and their interactions with phosphorus',
Australian Journal of Agricultural Research, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 969±86.
Miranda, M.J. 1991, `Area-yield crop insurance reconsidered', American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, vol. 73, no. 2, pp. 233±42.
Mood, A.M., Graybill, F.A. and Boes, D.C. 1974, Introduction to the Theory of Statistics,
3rd edn, McGraw-Hill, Kogakusha.
Newbery, D.M.G. and Stiglitz, J.E. 1981, The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization,
Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Park, W.I. and Sinclair, T.R. 1993, `Consequences of climate and crop yield limits on the
distribution of corn yields', Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 483±93.
Perry, M. and Hillman, B. 1991, The Wheat Book: A Technical Manual for Wheat Producers,
Department of Agriculture, Western Australia.
Pope, R.D. and Just, R.E. 1991, `On testing the structure of risk preferences in agricultural
supply analysis', American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 73, no. 3, pp. 743±8.
Robinson, S.D. 1995, `Selecting wheat varieties in a stochastic environment', paper pre-
sented to the 39th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural Economics Society,
University of Western Australia, Perth.
Tegene, A. and Kuchler, F. 1993, `A regression test of the present value model of US farm-
land prices', Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 135±43.
Willingness-to-pay for a forward wheat contract 155
# Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1997